

To my friend, Ricardo García Posada  
His extraordinary human quality ,sense  
of responsibility and revolutionary de-  
votion won the respect of all of us who  
came to know him.

The author

"On the authority of the Honorable Military  
Junta Government and according to the sentence  
made by the Council of War, the criminal Ricardo  
García was shot at 4 a.m. today October 18th, 1973.  
The body will be buried in the cementery of Copiapó  
before 7 p.m. and no more than five persons may  
assist. The remnants are not allowed to be transfe-  
rred for a year, by the order of the Military Fiscal  
Office" \*

\* The official notice received by his widow.

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## FOREWORD

I will thank my Chilean friends, my husband included, who helped me with data, figures and useful discussions about our common experience, both in Chile and now in the sad days of the political exile.

I will also thank Johan Galtung who stimulated me to write about my country, because he knows that to do something with Chile is to me almost "a basic need" to satisfy.

Thanks also to Valborg Jacobsen who worked hard to write the horrible manuscript she got, and to my Norwegian WIP comrades Einar and Tore who patiently helped me with the final correction of the English translation.

Finally, thanks to the Norwegian Refugee Council for the financial aid to translate this paper and to Toril, the Norwegian girl who did it.

The original paper was much more extensive than the present one. It was done a year ago, but has unfortunately not been published yet. Anyhow, I hope that the present abbreviated version gives some information about the past and present situation in Chile.

The basic trends in the Junta policies discussed in this paper have not changed, and the tragic situation of the Chilean people is now worse than a year ago. In that sense the main conclusions suggested in this paper are still actual.

The author

Oslo, July 1976

i. Introduction : the dimensions of evaluations

In September 1970, Chile arose world interest with the election of Salvador Allende as President of the Republic and with the access to Government of the Leftwing party coalition: the Unidad Popular.

The interesting part about the Chilean experience was the possibility of applying a program of extensive structural transformation within the traditional institutional framework; of interest was also the social and political process which these changes might generate.

The UP's program defined itself as "anti-imperialistic and anti-monopolistic" and the stated purposes of the program were to create the basis for the construction of a Socialist society. The Popular Government, headed by Salvador Allende, arose not only the interest but also the sympathies of the world, as was made quite clear in the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1972 when President Allende was greeted with spontaneous applause full of solidarity by the majority of the nations present there.

In September 1973, Chile once again amazed the world, but this time it was about a violent military insurrection that overthrew the Popular Government while setting up the most bloody dictatorship known in Latin America over the last years; with the most brutal repression that the Chilean working class has ever suffered; with the suppression of all human rights and the dissolution of all democratic institutions; an insurrection that styled itself "military uprising to save democracy".

Today people all over the world are looking for answers to the problem of humanity; today there is an ever growing understanding that what happens in a particular country is a mere symptom of what is happening to the entire world system. We therefore think it of interest to analyse the Chilean case which, given these two polar facts, clearly defines antagonistic alternatives, different conceptions and strategies as well as class interests and elite power on a national and international level.

We shall try and make a comparative analysis of both situations with respect to the concepts of "Development" and the dimensions of underlying values as defined in the "World Indicators Program", Chair in Conflict and Peace Research, University of Oslo (1).

"Development is the process of realization of the following social objectives: individual growth, pluralism, socio-economic growth, social justice, equality, autonomy, solidarity, participation, ecological balance."

The list, of course, is not exhaustive, but in this paper the items will serve as the core of analysis. In order to realize our objectives we shall have a look at the empiric behaviour in both situations, the U.P. period of 1970-73, and the military dictatorship period of 1973 onwards.

Firstly, we shall give a short explanation of the dimensions of value with their antonyms in brackets.

(1) Individual growth (alienation)

Defined as the satisfaction of basic necessities of the individual to be able to fulfil the minimal conditions of subsistence as a human being, including the satisfaction of necessities like food, clothing, housing, education, health, work and "politics". About the last item only a short comment: it would mean the need to transform oneself from being the object of history to be its subject: in other words, politics is one's conscious participation in the social processes.

(2) Pluralism (uniformity)

Defined as diversity of structures, ideas, as the possibility within social systems of the existence of alternative ideologies. From our point of view absolute pluralism does not exist; consequently there is a kind of mirage in class societies since the dominant ideology would permit a relative pluralism only as long as this does not represent a danger to its domination. In spite of this, we shall say that the framework of action for non-dominant ideologies is pluralism.

(3) Socio-economic growth (poverty)

It is the adequateness of the productive infrastructure with relation to the satisfaction of basic individual necessities.

(4) Equality (inequality)

Given the concept of a limited world with limited resources, the idea of equality has to do with the distribution of these resources. It is necessary to find a just and fair way of distribution for present and future members of society, possibly between a minimum floor and a maximum ceiling.

(5) Social justice (social injustice)

It is the supposition that the only valid condition for being entitled to social and material goods is the condition of being human, regardless of class, sex, age, colour etc. It implies equality of opportunity.

(6) Equity (exploitation)

Relationships of exploitation are given in systems with "social production" and individual appropriation; this is made possible whenever there exists form of ownership of the means of production, that divides people into buyers and sellers of working power. Equity by antithesis would be defined by relationships of social production and social appropriation of generated wealth. This presupposes social ownership of the means of production.

(7) Autonomy (dependence)

It is the right and capacity of nations to find their own destiny. It presupposes the development of own capacities and resources. By antithesis, dependence is the existence of asymmetric relationships between the different countries or regions that constitute a system of domination, with a center of hegemony and a surrounding periphery. One expression is in the existence of imperialism, a system of international exploitation.

(8) Solidarity (fragmentation)

It is the capacity to associate around class objectives and interests; it includes primary states of association, like f.ex. occasional associations as well as organizations conscious of its class in its maximum objectives; namely, the acquisition of power. It is horizontal interaction within a group or a class.

(9) Participation (marginalization)

It is, in the purest terms, the fight for power. It is the individual and class right to "take part" in the dynamism of history. In the widest terms; it is the viability of the sociopolitical

projects which ultimately impose the realization of no-realization of the values sketched within the pattern of these ideas.

(10) Ecological balance

Culture, in the most general terms possible, is the transformation of nature performed by man for his own benefit. Through history techniques and economic systems have developed to this end. The achieved development, however, has not always been a rational process. In the 20th century it reached a critical situation in which the level of indiscriminate exploitation, not always answering necessities but often deformations of the ruling economic systems, has made of the world a fountain of life on the verge of exhaustion. At the same time there is the contradiction that despite this "plunder" of natural resources, one third of humanity has not even their basic needs satisfied. Ecological balance means the taking care of the habitat, the rational and just use of natural resources. Logically one of the basic premises ought to be the social control of natural resources, not the kind exercised at the hands of multinational companies as is the case today. Ultimately, there is the necessity for prevention from pollution and other effects on nature and man resulting from this.

## 2. PERSONAL GROWTH (Alienation)

### 2.1. The satisfaction of basic needs

In accordance with the basic program of the Unidad Popular, to give an immediate response to the great problem of the masses, the short-term economic program was started in 1971. The fundamental directions of the program were:

The redistribution of income in favour of the wage-workers. To meet this end, the policy of readjusting the wages 100% to the increase in the cost of living was implemented and even more than 100% for the lowest paid sectors. In the same way, the family allotments were readjusted and some social services were altered: medical care, free school fees, distribution of half a litre of milk to every child under 14 years. These and other efforts created a considerable growth in the buying power of the wage earning masses.

As antecedence we may indicate that the norm of the preceding governments had been always to settle the wage-readjustment lower than the rise in the cost of living, and in this way preventing the worker's access to the consumption of essential goods.

As an intent to give a measure of the real impact of this redistribution of income, we may say that in 1971, during the first year, it is calculated that the real income of the wage earners increased more than 20%, only as an effect of the monetary readjustments. " This is of the 51% of the geographical income which the wages and salaries represented in 1970, in 1971 these rose to 59%, which represents the highest percentage in the history of the country" (Public declaration of Gonzalo Martner, Director of ODEPLAN, October 1971)

### 2.2 Food

In 1971, the increase in the consumption of some food products was as follows: "beef 15% increase, pork 18%, mutton 5%, poultry 16%, potatoes 55%, lemons 56%, dried milk 16%, sugar 37% spaghetti 28%, beer 20% " (2)

The availability of food products in 1972 compared to 1970 experienced an important increase for some products but a fall in the availability for beef and mutton, which, however traditionally are not of popular consumption.



Table 1  
 PRODUCTION + IMPORTS  
 1970-1972 (Kg.per/capita)

	1970	1972	% change
Wheat	152,7	178,1	16,6
maize	54,1	64,0	18,3
rice	9,7	11,8	21,6
potatoes	51,6	55,8	8,1
sugar	32,0	39,6	23,8
milk	123,9	171,8	38,7
oil	7,0	7,6	8,6
wine (lt)	47,0	52,6	11,9
beef	17,4	15,4	-11,5
mutton	3,5	2,8	-20,0
pork	4,9	6,1	24,5
chicken	6,4	7,6	18,7
egg	93,0	117,3	26,1

Source: Tercer Mensaje President Allende, p.282. Cited from  
 Stefan de Vylder: The rise and fall of U.P., Stockholm 1974

This table illustrates how in 1972 there was a greater availability of foodstuff in Chile. The question which necessarily rises from this is if the population really had improved its standard of living. It is necessary to remember that the year 1972 was characterized by "the black market" - sale from the big distributors and hoarding by the sectors of the population which had possessed a buying power very superior to the wage earning masses. The government tried to arrest this boycott by calling the people to organize itself in the price- and supply committees (Juntas de Abastecimiento y Precios - JAP) as mechanisms for popular control of the distribution.

On the other side, the sad and famous "march of the empty saucepans" was organized in 1972 by the sectors in opposition to the government (The National Party, The Christian Democrats, The Fatherland and Liberty, and others). The paradox of the situation is that those who marched were just the women who belong to the higher and medium layers of the society and who certainly had their cupboards filled.

With all these problems we do believe that it is not too hazardous to state that the period of the U.P. will be remembered in most of the homes of the marginal sectors of the society as the first time one could have milk, or as the first time when the hunger was stilled, not to mention as the period when the necessities of food were satisfied as regarding nutrition, proteins, and calories in equilibrium, and others that we cannot use in this work because of lack of more precise data. A good indicator of this information might

be the notable reduction in infantil mortality, a question we shall examine more in detail when treating health.

### After the military coup

One of the first economic acts of the Junta was to decree free prices for the majority of the essential products with the assumption that they would regulate themselves in the free game of supply and demand. The economic councellors assured that this was an act of urgency in order to "save the chilean economy", as the system of price-control, according to their criteria did not stimulate the producers. The "free market" prices, accompanied by other measures like the exchange parity which meant a permanent devaluation of the escudo, the policy of contention of wages and other similar measures opened up for an inflation without precedents in the history of the country.

The official figures show that the inflation in 1973 reached 508 % and in 1974 according to the same official figures 375%. After the imposition of an "anti-inflationary" "shock treatment" the rate of inflation was "reduced" to 340% for all of 1975. But even though these figures are incredibly high, non-official studies indicate that they do not reflect the real economic situation. These non-official studies bring different data, like the study undertaken by the jesuit pastor Jose Aldunate in the magazine MENSAJE, december 1974.

The author states that between September 1973 and September 1974 the wage of the workers deteriorated about 50%. Their income multiplied during this period eleven times while the prices multiplied twentytwo times. This extreme situation has brought the great masses of consumers to concentrate their spending exclusively on alimentation. To illustrate the analysis, it is indicated that a public official at minimum pay, and three family members to mantain, earned 7.290 escudos in september 1973 and 81.240 escudos in September 1974, while he spent 9% of his salary for 2 kilos of bread per day in September 1973 and 18% in Sept. 1974 and 22% in December the same year. (3)

The canadian professor Michael Chossudovsky shows in another study: "Based in the stimated fall of the real income for the low and medium layers, 85 % of the chilean population would be (March 1974) below the minimum income for subsistence, while almost

60% of the homes which constitute the income stretch of 0-2 vitals(\*) would be in a situation of hunger and extreme poverty" (4)

(\*) We can remark that sueldo vital (Living wage) is an administrative measure for salaries. It is supposed to be the minimum amount on which one person can survive.

Professor Andre Gunder Frank afirm that "according to official prices and the official (sueldo vital)"living wage", in February 1974, family bread consumption alone and the bus fares to earn it amounted to about 80% of the "living wage", and that by February 1975, the cost of the bread alone, without the bus, was 74% of the "living wage" (5)

TABLE 2

ECONOMIC GENOCIDAL BREAD WAGE

Date	Public Employee's Minimum Salary Expressed in kilos of bread per day	Hourly Minimum Wage Expressed in kilos of bread per hour	Hours of work at minimum wage necessary to earn one kilo of bread
Sept 1973	22 kilos	1.45 kilos	0.69 hours
May 1974	-	0.41	2.54
Sept 1974	11	-	-
Feb. 1975	-	0.17	5.78
March 1975	4	-	-
Dec. 1975	2.8	0.16	6.1

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Source: Andre Gunder Frank "Economic Genocide in Chile"  
Second open letter to Milton Friedman and Arnold  
Harberger. April 1976

This critical situation is officially accepted and the Junta members as well as the economic advisers' group have characterized the present state of affairs as a policy of "tightening the belt", the popular way of saying it. We think it necessary, however, to underline that such a policy does not inevitably mean a sacrifice equally shared by all sections of the population. Immediately we shall present some figures of the kind of income redistribution to which the economic measures have led

Professor Chossudovsky, in the above mentioned study, points out that "according to CEDEM questionnaire (1967) approximately 90% of the receivers had net incomes below four vitales "liv. wage" and got approximately 65% of the total income op.cit. Our estimations for March 1975 suggest that the earning power of this group had probably diminished at least 60%. He says further ~~on~~: "The redistribution for March 1974 means a transfer of at least 25% of the total (net) income in favour of the 5% of richer people. In other words, the richer 5% had increased its participation from 22,7% (CEDEM\*, 1967) to about 50% in the total income". \*(Demographic Studies Center)

### 2.3 Clothing

As far as clothing is concerned, we do not have precise data about how much consumption materials and clothes increased during the U.P. period; we may, however, deduce that the impact of the income redistribution must have freed resources from the **focus** on alimentation for the benefit of clothing, furniture and other items. A conversation with a prominent deputy from the industrial world in present-day Chile may give us some indication as to consumption of such goods now and during the U.P. Government period.

Interview with Raul Salhi, President of the Society for Manufacturing Promotion: (SOFOFA) (6)

"During the U.P. Government period consumption was completely upset. For instance, the consumption of footwear ended up by being the highest in the world. If we analyse production sectionwise, we will find that the ~~consumption was~~'nt normal. On the section customary consumption of goods like food, footwear and textiles there was a diminution of 5,2% in 1974." (Military Government)

Thus, this prominent manufacturer considers positively the diminution of consumption of such essential goods.

The short-term economic plan of the U.P. started with the premise of utilizing to a maximum the already set up industrial capacity, which as far as the textiles, clothing and footwear industries were concerned, gave the following figures for 1970. The textile industry used only 78,86% of its set up capacity while the clothing and footwear industries used 83,74%. For this reason, in 1971, with the reactivation of internal demand, the production of the above mentioned industries increased as follows:

TABLE 3

INDEX OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION (volume)

1968=100

	1970	1971	% variation 1971/70
Textiles	96,0	110,1	14,7
Clothes & footwear	104,8	118,9	13,4

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Source: National Institute of Statistics (INE), taken from Stefan de Vylder op.cit.

## 2.4 Housing

The program for house construction indicated by the U.P. in 1971 is the most ambitious dwelling program ever undertaken by any government. In 1970, the country needed 500.000 dwellings. During the decade there was a construction rate of 20.000 per year, the main emphasis of construction being on houses set up for the private sector. This is so given the existence of a decree called DFL 2 which guaranteed the private contractors ample margins of profit while permitting a "middle layer" section of the population to select the acquisition of one of these dwellings by an of Savings- and Loans Associations.

The U.P. tried to change the distribution of resources by placing the major responsibility for house construction on the Public Section in favour of the population groups most in need. But, simultaneously the same system of guarantees for the private sector was maintained, which meant that the DFL 2 was still operating, and so also the system of Savings and Loans.

In 1971, this was the condition/<sup>under</sup> which the Public Sector starts the construction of 80.000 dwellings. It is, furthermore, a program of mobilization to absorb the unemployed working power. In October 1971 30.000 dwellings are delivered, a fact that gives testimony to the success of the program. But this situation is to change: while the set-up capacity of the construction industry is working maximally, it is no longer possible to augment any further the production of cement, roofs, paving tiles etc. Consequently the rhythm of construction is to knock against the objective limitation of the productive system and the limitation imposed by the sector that already in 1972 had/a highly efficient economic boycott. The Government ~~tries~~<sup>created</sup> to remedy the necessity for material within the Construction branch by increasing the import of material, a problem that is partially solved. However, during the whole period there are thousands of houses whose construction is stopped for lack of nails, windows, tiles etc.. Despite all these difficulties, though, in 1972 there are delivered 28.000 houses of those which were started in 1971, more than the average from earlier years. With regard to construction matters the Public Sector is also responsible for the conclusion of 50.000 m<sup>2</sup> against 28.000 in 1970, in the building of hospitals; 225.000 m<sup>2</sup> against 79.000 in school-constructions; and the 40.000 m<sup>2</sup> represented by the setting up of a building in the centre of the town, destined to be the headquarters of the III International Meeting of the UNCTAD. This building is later on appointed as a popular center for cultural and social activities; today it is converted by the Junta into its Government headquarters. (7)

All these data correspond to the Construction programs for permanent dwellings. However, in all underdeveloped countries the housing problems are extremely acute affairs because of the existence of bands of real misery surrounding the big cities and which, in Latin-America, are given different names as for instance favelas in Brazil, villas miseria in Argentina and poblaciones callampas in Chile.

Earthquakes, winter storms and other natural catastrophies aggravate exceedingly the problem in Chile. That is why the Popular Government, in its incapacity to give an integral

answer to the need for permanent dwellings, should give mitigating solutions while realizing it is only a partial answer and by no means a satisfactory one. Thus, the so-called "transit-camps" are initiated; they consist in the delivery "medias aguas", i.e. wood-panels with doors, windows and a clinkstone roof, a set-up that under no circumstances can be considered as permanent dwellings but, at least, they are a rudimentary protection against rains and wind.

Apart from the urbanization works there is the installation of drinking water and electricity in many of the so called "callampa" (shanty-town) populations.

In connection with the housing problem in Chile, a settler's movement came into existence and that, during the U.P. period, acquire great importance. The need to confront bureaucratic problems penetrating all governmental organisms, the need to confront the boycott of the construction industry on behalf of the private sector, and the emergence of mass organizations, turn the "fight for housing" into a mobilizing element as regards the rest of the fundamental problems facing the government.

The settler's movement thus carries along with it, in the above mentioned camps, as populations, the development of higher levels of organization with a differently generated way of confronting difficulties. Some camps end up as models of a new way of living together (and of fighting) by restoring internal discipline and attacking the problems of sanitation, alcoholism, health, of taking care of the children etc.

With regard to the housing matter, the Military Junta has showed some kind of "success". Once more the construction branch has acquired considerable increase since all private activity that was earlier selfparalyzed has again come to life; According to the Junta's official information, the present situation is as follows: "Works that were to be carried out by the Executive Board (of the Public Sector) have been transferred to private enterprises through the system of "delegated administration, real costs and reciprocal guarantees". "The conclusion of already started works and the suppression of state and fiscal control over the distribution and sale of construction material are likewise being carried out". ( 8 )

Between September 1973 and October 1974, the plan was to finish 35.016 dwellings. We shall only comment shortly on the housing situation. Firstly, it seems evident that the Junta is confronted with problems of a different order than was the Popular Government. In other words, what is needed the first year of construction is to finish dwellings already started in the previous period. In order to fulfil this, the Junta counts on a normal supply of material and on the "voluntary" cooperation of the private sector which today is participating with its complete productive capacity.

In order to make a comparison between both periods we ought to take up a problem concerning "general policy orientation". The Popular Government gave priority to the construction of dwellings for lower income groups; the Junta, in accordance with its policy of "social economics of the market" leaves the problem of priorities as a question that ought to find its answer in the market, i.e. through the supply and demand mechanism. House construction, then, is once more an activity whose objective is private profitability with no social orientation whatsoever. As an illustrative point we may note that in 1974, according to data proportioned by the Society of Manufacturing Promotion, construction prices experienced an increase of 375,9%. This, undoubtedly, raises costs and makes it complicated for the low-income sectors to get houses. Other figures make one suspect that the increase of prices is actually much higher than what is officially accepted. Between September 1973 and July 1974, according to the Statistic Bulletin of the Chilean Chamber of Construction, cement suffered a price increase of 3.654%, asbestos sheets one of 3.654%, nails one of 3.620% (ERCILLA No. 2049, 6-12 Nov. 1974). The Minister of Housing, Rear-admiral Arturo Troncoso declares the following to the ERCILLA No. 2049 (Nov. 1974):

"The price level that housing has reached today prevents further the possibility of the great masses of Chileans of having access to a property that satisfies their family necessities. At present the cost of a dwelling in our land is the double of that of a house built in the US and in many European countries, this with the further disadvantage that its capacity and comfort is inferior to that of US and European houses".

Such a declaration from the Junta Minister reveals the reality



which the policy implemented by the Military Government has conducted. The question left to be answered, then, is: Given this reality, will there be a change of dwelling policy? At the moment of writing this paper the answer is no.

## 2.5 Health

The health problem in underdeveloped countries expresses itself as lack of human and material resources of such a proportion that it cannot be given a complete short-term solution. The implementation of health programs achieves relatively visible results only in the context of some years. This is why, in order to make a comparison between our two periods, we can only analyse the orientation of general policies applied to the entire health problem. Some figures may, nevertheless, be illustrative of certain immediate consequences of the health policy.

We have at our disposal the following figures regarding infant mortality, the variation of which, we believe, is fundamentally due to the preventive programs of summer-diarrhoea and to the nutritional improvement of pregnant mothers and the newly-born, programs that were carried out by the U.P. Government. In 1969 the official figure of infant-mortality was 78,7 per 1000 born alive. By 1973 this rate had probably dropped to 65,3 per 1000 and, according to the last report from the CEPAL (Economic Commission for Latin America), in 1974 this assessment was once again likely to be bordering 77,3 per 1000. (9)

Despite this relative success, at least with regard to the improvement of one population-group, namely the children, we find it impossible to affirm that medicine available at the time has suffered quantitatively during the U.P. period. We do not dispose of figures illustrating the increase of doctors per inhabitant, of available beds or of medical consultations realized in the relevant period. Nevertheless, we do think that a new way of tackling the health problems is visible. In even the remotest suburbs and places there are created so-called "Health Commandos". They are organizations made up by personnel from the Health Service,

doctors, nurses, assistants and neighbours whose fundamental aim is to prepare the population for active participation in solution of the problems. The latter vary from the need to get a policlinic, improve medical attention, rationalize and utilize maximally all available assistance to more remote places with vaccination and urgency attention. The so-called "Health-train" is organized; it cuts across the country, reaching rural areas that have been without medical service for generations.

In 1974, facing Health policy, Air Force Colonel and Junta Minister of Health, Dr. Alberto Spoeres declares that

" - - -the State of Chile recognizes beyond her national borders the right to health as a whole and indivisible entity. To us health is a battle of priorities since one cannot conceive of a country trying to break away from underdevelopment unless complete attention is given to the most valuable element that man counts with". (ERCILLA 2029).

However, in accordance with the policy of reducing public expenses, resources for the Health Services have been cut down, as indicates the following piece of information:

"The Government has decided to reduce budget items regarding the National Medical Service for Employees". (El Mercurio Internacional, December, January 5th, 1975)

Simultaneously, there has taken place a decrease of personnel in the State Medical Services, a corollary of an order issued by the authorities to reduce staff in all public services. In the field of Health, the elimination of staff amounts to a figure of approximately 9.000.

As far as professional doctors are concerned, they are still emigrating from the country; this time not for political reasons but for others of economic characters and professional possibilities etc. With respect to this we quote an item of information found in the magazine ERCILLA No.2050:

"Because of the epidemic of renunciations affecting the doctors the National Health Service is being confronted with a delicate situation that preoccupies the authorities. The doctors do not only present their resignations on the grounds that remunerations are low, but also because of lack of resources in hospitals and clinics, all of which forces a rejection of patients. The childrens' hospital "Roberto del Rio" has just manifested this latter symptom: out of a total of 30 doctors, 20 have presented their resignations; until now there has been no interest in filling the vacancies".

In relation to the situation mentioned above one would also have to point to the remarkable drop in medical staff due to the political situation from September 11 and onwards. Many of these persons are still in jail, others in exile while still quite a number were shot in different parts of the country. In a country where about 5.000 doctors are at hand in the state services, such factors must necessarily have their conspicuous effects.

The Medical association that represents the interests of the majority of doctors following the Junta Government has suggested the following as a general health policy:

"The Health services being free of charge, stimulate unnecessary consultations where they contribute to encourage demand. A possible solution, according to the request presented by the Association, would be the eventual step of medicine towards the system of market economy; in such a way that the health teams, which are working very efficiently with minimum costs for the benefit of the patients, would hand over health services to the local community. If the market economy is guaranteed in Chile and if the health sector joins it, such a thing does not mean that team-work in the named sector will fall victim to commercialism because, regarding this, the Medical Association should be ready to protect the ethics and technical efficiency of its collegiates". (10)

These are, then, in general lines, the two ways of orientation: socialize vs. make private.

We believe that in an economy like the Chilean with its enormous asymmetry in income distribution, the introduction of Medicine in its totality into the market system would practically mean the condemnation to death of large social sectors which, until today have had access to medical services to a certain extent, however badly. It is not enough to declare that health shall be an activity of priority; it all ought to be concretely translated into actions that allow the realization of such a goal.

## 2.6 Education

As regards education we may count as quantitative gains - but doing so only up to 1972 - the extension of Basic Education which covered 98% of the school population between 4 and 14 years of age (until 1970 it included only 85%); secondary, professional and technical education experienced an augmentation of 38% while

the university increased its inscription with 100% in the course of these three years. ( 11 )

To the increase in school education one has to add the enormous effort on a national level to raise the technical capacity of workers and the education of adults. In order to fulfil this goal, capacitation programs had been initiated in collaboration with universities and a state capacitation institute called INACAP; there also came into being other organisms of planification concerning national capacitation which together with the enterprises that had been transferred to the social area, were implementing programs with the object of raising the technical level of labour and diminish the marginal situation of education to which Chilean workers are subjected.

Nevertheless, we think that these quantitative gains were not the most important ones; although they are significant they do not tackle the fundamental problem of modifying the educational system, i.e. of making it fairer accesswise and more rational as regards the needs that such a system ought to fulfil in an underdeveloped country like ours.

In 1972 emerged a project suggested by the Government, to attain a complete modification of the system. It is the project called Unified National School, ENU. The plan came to stir up an enormous national polemic since the political opposition turned it into a weapon of attack against the Government,

The opposition mobilize<sup>d</sup> all its potential to destroy the project.

Fundamentally, the project postulated the creation of an unified system of education intended to incorporate both private and state elements as far as human and material resources are concerned. This meant that property belonging to private colleges will continue to be so but that the material infrastructure (campus, laboratories, gymnastic halls etc.) also is used by public colleges or viceversa. The idea was that in this manner existing resources could be utilized in a more just way. The underutilization, for example, of school-room amphitheatres etc. would thereby be changed into full capacity utilization.

So far the orientation regarding educational democratization or, put differently, the idea of expanding access to existing resources. As for the system responding to the needs of the

country, one would have to reformulate study plans in such a way that the final aim of the school years should be not only the entrance into the University, but also allow other intermediate options in technical, artistic and public careers etc.

The above mentioned projects were intended to prepare the pupils in the course of their school-years for some activity. Unlike in the prevailing system where those who reach only the sixth or seventh year of basic education leave without any training whatsoever, thus ending up as unqualified working-power. And those who conclude secondary school without being accepted into the university leave with a mere superficial scientific - humanistic education, their only chance being to work as office-clerks, bank-employees and salesmen - they will have to learn the new occupations simply by practising them, since not even type-writing is taught in secondary schools.

The project furthermore contained new patterns of administration and active participation of pupils and teachers, while parents were allowed to take part in educational activities. The ENU would really have meant a true revolution in the educational system of the country with its new objectives in education and, naturally, a new kind of practice.

Logically, projects like health, housing and others would have to knock against conservative interests from both inside and outside the educational system and, as we have already mentioned, were soon transformed into an arm of political attack. Even so, the Government presented the project to the people to have a national debate in colleges and elsewhere. Like so many other initiatives, however, its realization<sup>was</sup> cut short by the 11th of September 1973.

The situation we have just describes refers to only one aspect of education, namely that of formal or school education. However, to widen the concept of education, there is another, very important aspect referring to nonformal education, or rather, to the socio-political growth of the masses, to the acquisition of elements of analysis and action in social intercourse. It is in nonformal education that individuals learn in every-day life, in work, in social struggle, and that cannot be measured, nor

understood in the same way as one measures school-wisdom acquired in training institutions. (12)

As to nonformal education we may say without fear of missing the point, that development during the U.P. period was considerable. In our opinion this fact was due to the enormous degree of general popular mobilization for the process of change that everybody was living through. Because of the very situation, everybody felt bound to project their individual perspectives into the process of change. Each day, face to face with the changes one was experiencing, one also had to take a stand. There were the Agrarian Reform in the fields, the Educational Reform in the schools; participation; employers' lockouts and labourers' seizure of factories in the industrial world; the creation of Supply and Price Committees in the field of provisions; the Settlers' Movement in connection with housing; in short, all the mechanisms of popular participation mentioned above. (13)

Before entering an analysis of the educational policy of the Military Junta we find it necessary to mention certain examples of what the repression by military authority has come to mean from the very moment when the Coup d'Etat took place. On September 11 students, professors and administration staff gathered together in the University lecture rooms, thus following directives emitted by the CUT and the Government. In the National Technical University there came to military attack with great display of men and weapons. Witnesses among those who survived give account of many dead people and hundreds of prisoners that were immediately transferred to the sport stadiums, virtually a prisoners' camp. The treatment given that University was due to the fact that the majority of students and professors were left-oriented including the director, professor Enrique Kirberg who is still in prison and whose wife and daughters have suffered cruel treatment according to the testimony given in the Tribunal set up in Mexico, to investigate the Junta. (14)

During the weeks following the coup, military directors are put into office in all universities and secondary colleges around the country. A mass-elimination of students and professors was thus produced; the elaboration of lists of name containing "marxists" and "suspicious" persons started. Those declared to be marxists were immediately eliminated. Punishment varied from the expulsion from the University or College to execution by shooting,

all according to the gravity of the cases. Elimination likewise includes the official staff. Dr. Luis Izquierdo from the Faculty of Science, University of Chile, contributes with the following figures:

Elimination in the University of Chile covers approximately 30% of all members of the faculty and 11% of the non-academic staff (The University of Chile has 50% of the students of the country) In the University of Concepción, 30% of the academic group were dismissed, the Technical University of Santa Maria lost 25% of its members, etc. Summing up, then, the Universities that take care of 75,6% of all students have lost about 29% of their academic staff (Chile-America No.5,1975).

In August 1974, the General of the Air Force Brigade and Proxy-Director of the University of Chile, Augustin Rodriguez Pulgar declares that

"As to the elimination of students, staff and professors I believe that in general this task is now accomplished. It was a difficult task which fell on the shoulders of the Proxy-Director preceding me. It is possible that some problems are still left, but they will be eliminated as they are being discovered"

(El Mercurio internacional. Aug. 12-18, 1974).

General Pinochet declares the following to Ercilla No.2049:

"The Government is aware that its fundamental obligation ~~resides~~ with the formation of a new mentality; one must make the seed mentioned bear fruit in the young generations; and the earth that serves as fertilizer is education.

Regarding what a "new mentality" means to the Junta we may for example point out the incorporation of military subject matters on all levels of education.

"In 1974, the Military Staff of National Defense fulfilled among other tasks - - - and in cooperation with the Ministry of Education realized the teaching of a subject matter denominated 'Security and National Defense' on all levels of education, universities included" (15)

"with the purpose of depoliticizing education, a complete revision was made of the operating study program and educational texts"

In the Universities - - -

"In the area of teaching an analysis has been made of existing careers concerning ends, plans and programs of study. The work has brought about an improvement, since all careers and subject matters that do not contribute to the professional formation as to the development of the country has been suppressed; in other words, careers

and subject matters that only pursue political objects. Other careers have been established that represent the country's evident need for cultural and economic expansion"

With reference to educational inscription the Junta itself has declared that the increase of university matriculations during the U.P. period and even before, as this increase has taken place all through the decade, was an unreal and scarcely convenient situation. Hence, the implementation of two general policies: one to reduce the public financing of the Universities, another to obtain the self-financing of them. This policy has led to a brusque reduction of matriculations for the reason that entry-fees are beyond the reach of many families. To indicate the problem we extract some pieces of information from the press:

"According to previous calculations made by Prox-Director of the Office for the Selection and Administration of Students, University of Chile, this year (1974) 27.000 candidates were inscribed, a figure inferior to that of last year by 1,8%. With such a state of affairs the increase rate, progressing in 1970 with from 10% to 11%, would be reversed".

(Ercilla 2029)

We further extract a newspaper paragraph that throws light upon costs involved in university entrance. In this connection it is necessary to make clear that prior to 1973 State Universities were free of charge with only an insignificant entry fee being required. Private universities demanded larger amounts, but as these entrance fees were also subsidized by the State, they did not represent real costs. Today the situation appears as depicted by El Mercurio:

"The worth of the basic right and obligatory minimal quota that each student matriculated in the University of Chile ought to pay (and which would be the lowest one) amounts to 95.000 escudos, i.e. 3,5 times more than the vital monthly salary valid until February 28th of this year. Such a fact excludes the possibility of inscribing children from families with low incomes. It is, nevertheless, estimated that the latter have already fallen victim to the academic mentality typical of the ultimate part of primary education (1st to 8th grade), or they lose in the Secondary School (9th to 12th grade). Studies realized by University investigators show that no more than about 12% of children from low-income families fulfil Secondary School. Consequently, those who do postulate for the University are principally of middle-class status and upwards, their entry fees being superior to the vital income".

(El Mercurio, ed. int. 10/16 February, 1975).



Such information reflects the existing reality.

In our opinion this kind of attitude clearly illustrates the objective of the policy of self-financing, i.e. to limit in an absolute manner access to education for those who because of their status are unable to pay the costs.

## 2.7 Work

One of the most evident successes of short-term economic policy recorded by the U.P. was the accelerated reduction of unemployment. The problem of unemployment in Chile, as in other countries, has the drawback that a large part of the working power apparently employed actually exists as a sort of "disguised unemployment", i.e. unproductive occupations such as intermediaries in the commercialization process and other branches. The latter kind of people are popularly called "medios palbs" (lit. half-chickens) and their job consists of making half the work for another person thus sharing the salary of the title-bearers.

Without assert that the solutions given by the Popular Government to the problem of unemployment were the best and most rational ones, we do insist that, at least, it absorbed unemployed working power at a rhythm and in quantities that lack precedents in Chilean history. As an immediate consequence this brought the solution of vital problems for more than 1.000.000 Chileans if one includes the access to basic consumption of this group of unemployed people and their families.

As far as the percentage of the unemployment rate is concerned, it dropped from 6% in 1970 to 3,6% in 1973.

The unemployment rate officially recognized by the Junta is presently fluctuating between 9 and 10% of the entire working power. Explanations given in numerous discussions, debates etc. seem to fall into two groups. Firstly, the Junta feels that its anti-inflation policy to reduce public expenditure ought to be carried through although it might include high social costs, i.e. increased unemployment. On the other hand, it considers the world crisis to be the fundamental reason for the elevated Chilean index, the economic depression at an international level,

which has brought as its consequence the augmentation of unemployment all around the world, including those countries with "strong" and developed economies like the U.S. and Europe. Nevertheless, information obtained from the Central Unica de trabajadores (CUT) in exile indicates a much more elevated number of unemployed persons than the one officially recognized. It mentions some 500.000 labourers, which in percentage corresponds to almost 20% of the entire working-force. Among factors not recognized by the Junta as counting in such a sharp increase in unemployment we may list for instance political persecution, the bankruptcy of many medium- and small-sized enterprises, and the elimination of staff from public and other services.

## 2.8 Politics

Defined as "the need to pass from being the object of History to being the subject".

We think that this necessity and right has already been characterized through our analysis as regards basic needs to be fulfilled in order to obtain a process of "individual growth".

At every relevant point we have touched on the need for nutrition, clothing, housing, health, education and labour; in other words, the entire popular mobilization process created in support of the U.P. Government with the parallel mechanisms of mass-participation created to implement the fight for satisfying basic needs.

The massive collective mobilization provided many persons with a channel of expression, communication and organization. We hold this to be the fundamental thing which exemplifies our idea of politics in the best possible manner. It goes beyond the formal electoral vote-mechanisms, or belonging to a determined party, or supporting one Government or another. Such a complex process carries within it all these expressions; it even proceed further than the permanency of such formal expressions requires. Today political parties are prohibited, so also labour unions and general elections. Despite this, we think that the consciousness of a people which finally was beginning to be a subject of History, goes on existing. The right to practice politics in such terms cannot be suppressed by means of a decree however compulsory this be, neither systematic, generalized repression.

### 3.- Pluralism

To impose its dominant ideology, the bourgeois democratic system makes use of a whole gamut of domination mechanisms running from "persuasion" to institutionalized exercise of force. At the same time, however, the so-called "democratic liberties" allow for a certain frame of activity and the expression/diffusion of an alternative ideology. The frame is always limited, though; when the system of domination is threatened, all its defense mechanisms are set going. This is almost a norm in the class societies: So in these terms "pure pluralism" doesn't exist. In order to capture some aspects of the concept <sup>we</sup> can say that exist a "relative pluralism" when the system permits a certain field of action for alternative ideologies. If we accept this definition as

pluralism, we would consequently have to admit that during the U.P. period there was an unprecedented accentuation of it.

All media of expression were allowed from the use of mass communication media to the utilization of votes and existing legislation. Tolerance finally reached the extreme of permitting groups in opposition to the Government to surpass the legislation by force.

Traditionally, in Chile there have been an absolute predominance of rightwing sectors over the general media of communication. The situation was not substantially modified by the Popular Government, with the opposition taking advantage of this enormous power-machinery to its utmost capacity. The Government, the U.P. and the Left in general made an effort to oppose conservative domination by increasing the number of publications, broadcasting stations and T.V. channels on leftwing hands. Still the working of such mechanisms is more complex than simply reaching a quantitative balance; it is no short-term task to break consumption-habits of information, to break away from a fixed pattern, however transformed the contents of the message.

In the case of television, sounding of opinions showed that onlookers preferred by far to look at programs such as serial short-stories and those of adventures, films largely imported from the U.S.A., to programs of national information, reports or others. Theoretically, in their competition for the T.V. audience the media supporting the Government ought to have appeared on the stage rivalling those belonging to the opposition. However, the rules of the game were already given by the media with years of experience in domination; consequently transmissions

did not reflect the acute situation developing in the country nor was there sufficient space to supply ideological orientation. Available time was mostly taken up by "Inspector Colombo", "Mac'Millan and his Wife", "The FBI in Action" and other internationally well-known programs. With respect to the press, the Left increased the number of its publications even though the problem of competition for the market was also operating for this medium. The Editorial Quimantu (stateowned), for example, started the publication of child-literature thereby trying to introduce new contents, short-stories and fables by national authors, the idea of solidarity and anti-commercial values etc. It attempted to create new images in the children as well as in their parents. Nevertheless, a modest "The Little Goat" of national production was utterly unable to compete with the powerful "The Rich Uncle Mac'Duck" made in the U.S. That is why such a children's publication of unquestionable technique and quality was destined to disappear.

Women's and teen-agers' magazines constitute another example; they were wholly unable to compete with their well-established rivals in consumption habits.

The same situation prevailed in the field of broadcasting which, to sum up, is to say that virtually the entire apparatus of the media of mass-communication remained as good as untouched as a power structure. One tried to balance its impact through competition on the market, a rivalry already defined beforehand in unequal terms.

The Military Junta understood the real importance of the impact of the mass-communication media. For this reason, the very day of the 11th, armed attack on T.V. canals, printing houses and broadcasting stations took place, all media in the course of the day of the coup, came under military control. Transmission of official announcements came on the air as did military marches, an unequivocal indication of the transmissional origin. A couple of the media offered resistance to the orders of suspending transmissions, thanks to which the last words of President Allende came on the air. The message informed the people about his decision to remain in "La Moneda", thus fulfilling until the last consciousness the mandate given him by the people in September 1970. The only way of bringing the two radiostations,

the "Corporación" and the "Magallanes", to silence was by bombarding them.

A military proclamation had all dailies and magazines suspended until further military orders. Some days later, once the Junta was in complete control of the country, certain publications were allowed anew, subject though to military censorship. The only authorized newspaper was El Mercurio, an example of confidence from the new regime. Gradually other publications worthy of the same kind of confidence were permitted back on the scene. In Santiago there appeared eleven morning papers of which five were brought to a close on the very same day of publication. Later on the Christian Democratic Party stopped publishing its mouth-piece La Prensa (Feb. 1974), with the result that only some dailies are coming out at the present moment, all of them unconditional Junta-followers.

Out of 155 radiostations 40 were eliminated. All in all, 28 newspapers and magazines were withdrawn by force.

General Pinochet has declared on several occasions that freedom of the press does exist in Chile, that there is no more censorship than the "common sense". His criteria, nevertheless, seems rather narrow and do not always work as is laid down in theory. We may in this connection mention that despite elimination of all leftist media of communication, it is still felt necessary by the Junta to censor even the media of its own supporters. As an anecdote we would like to make known that in an interview with General Rodriguez Pulgar, Proxy-Director of the University of Chile, there appear certain blank spaces, an unmistakable sign of censorship (Ercilla No. 2038).

In November 1973 the Junta suppressed a morning-paper called Tribuna, the organ of the fascist organization named "Fatherland and Liberty", for having divulged false news. (It had published the detention of Carlos Altamirano, Secretary General of the Socialist Party, searched for all over the country). In March 1975 the radiostation "Presidente Balmaceda", of christian democratic orientation, was brought to silence for ten days with the following piece of official information: "The National Direction of Social Communication closed the mentioned transmitter for ten days".

The Governmental body emitted a declaration in which it pointed out that this medium of diffusion had been distorting

the truth for a long time. It was further added that in the months of February and March contact was taken with the Board of Directors of the transmitter "to correct the observed tendency". Bewildering comments and bits of information nevertheless continued for seven more days" (El Mercurio, 24/30, March 1975). "In the same statement the Direction announced that a book said to attack the harmony and security of the country, was seized, without indicating which text it was". "As to confiscated literature, yesterday a book written by the ex-deputy Claudio Orriego was seized. The essay is called The Ideal of History, a 120 pages long analysis of a new world-conflagration. The author compares the actual world crisis with the one experienced before the Second World War while remembering the voices of Maritain and Camus from that time. The Direction of Social Communication recollected the complete samples of the book, the covers of which were being printed at that moment. Later on the order to size samples and all unusual material was fully met with in the workshops. Radio President Balmaceda made known and commented on the fact in its night programs". (El Mercurio, loc.cit)

Let us only comment that the author mentioned above is a militant of the Cristian Democratic Party and was a prominent opponent to the Allende Government.

Regarding the foreign press, twelve correspondents representing well-known international media have been expelled by the Junta, among them Pierre Reben (Swiss), arrested and tortured in 1974; Augustin Guianoni (Uruguay) expelled in May 1974; Walter Rauch from the TIME Magazine declared an agent for international communism.

Finally, we should like to add that the media of diffusion functioning in Chile at the present moment are, according to General Pinichet's own words "true collaborators with the Government to the extent that they transmit trustworthy information although this does not mean that they should silence critics or be satisfied with acting as mere transmitters of official ideas or purposes". (El Mercurio, 3/9 March 1975). Furthermore, the media presently in operation are the same that the President of the U.S. claimed had received economic aid from the CIA. (Declaration by Ford, Sept 16th, 1974, published for instance in El Mercurio international edition Sept. 16-22, 1974)

#### 4.- Equality, Social Justice, and Equity

##### 4.1 Transformation in the property system

As an example of a policy aiming at more equality, social justice and equity let us look at the agrarian reform, aiming at redistribution of agricultural property.

According to Jacques Chonchol, ex-Minister of Agriculture of the U.P., the agrarian policy pursued may be summarized under four main headings (16) "First it is a question of accelerating the transformation of the agrarian regime by expropriating the large agricultural properties (the estimated minimum size for expropriation is 80 hectares of basic irrigation land) in order to redistribute it among the peasant majority. Immediately the idea must be to put into effect new structures capable of securing better productive rentability at the same time constituting the fundament for a new social system able to resolve the problems of the countryside. The third series of measures tend to reorganize the system of production for the real utilization of agricultural wealth and also for the acquisition of a sufficient income-level for the peasant population. Ultimately, immediate problems produced by increased popular demand for food products must be solved"

For realize its program of agricultural changes, the U.P. makes use of the law of agrarian reform passed during the cristian democratic government of Eduardo Frei. Despite the serious limitations of the law, the expropriation project is accelerated. Credits and assistance of various kinds are applied to the totality of the reformed territory, which in 1973 presented the following figures concerning landed properties and expropriated areas:

TABLE 4

LANDED PROPERTIES AND SUPERFICIES EXPROPIATED BY  
THE CRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC AND UNIDAD POPULAR GOVERNMENT

(in hectares)

Period	no. of landed properties	irrigated areas (has)	non-irrig. areas (has)	total (has)	no. of families living there
1965-70					
(C.D. Gov)	1.408	290.601	3.273.951	3.564.522	20.976
1970-73					
(U.P. Gov)	3.628	394.477	5.190.850	5.585.372	33.948
TOTAL	5.036	685.078	8.464.801	9.149.880	54.925

Source: "The Chilean economy under the Popular Unity Government"  
Santiago, 1974

The total number of landed properties between 51 hectares and more than 5000 amounts to 37.448 in 1965; the number of estates expropriated between 1965 and 1973 is about 5.063, which means 13,44%. In terms of surface the relation would be as follows: the total of hectares for these 37.448 estates is around 28.886,000 while the expropriated hectares represent 9.149.880 which means 31%. We may in other words say that by 1973 69% of the farmland surface included in medium and large scale estates still rests on private hands.

Above relation is emphasized with the purpose of showing that the 9.149.000 hectares of expropriated land are not of the best quality; nor do they represent real cultivable surface seen as a totality. It is to be noted, for instance, that only 7% is irrigated area .

Our observations do by no means pretend to challenge the importance of this redistribution of agricultural property or the impact set in motion by the Agrarian Reform in the countryside and in farm activities on the whole. The 5.036 expropriated estates carry<sup>d</sup> the possibility of being transformed into dynamic farming entities. A hasty estimation can make us believe that the number of 54.924 families living in the reformed area may easily have doubled once crops, credit and technical aid etc. are introduced. Besides, the Agrarian Reform, as other economic activities, is aspiring to introduce into the countryside new types of relations of production, new modes of administration and relationships between different units, between the small and medium-sized private owned properties and the reformed area.

The Agrarian Reform produced a high degree of mobilization in farming areas in connection with the requirements to continue the process of expropriation. At the same time it led to demands for technical and credit assistance from the State. The <sup>Ma</sup>puche peasants' fight for land was especially important their territories have been systematically usurped by the big landholders. Legal lawsuits for the possession of land had always been won by the landowners who had been in the position to pay lawyers and judges. It is also known the use of force and



brutality applied against the Mapuche population, often with the result of eliminating entire families. Resistance offered by the old proprietors and by the landed gentry in general manifested itself in various ways and by different degrees of intensity throughout the period. They made use of everything from legal opportunities to actions of terrorism, not shying such vital element of production as the economic boycott.

The land-owners of the large scale properties (those being bigger than 80 irrigated hectares) subdivided their properties into small ones. In that way they could avoid expropriation.

It was a determining legal weapon for the diminution of the true future effect of the Agrarian Reform. It is presumed that before the initiation of the Agrarian Reform at least 1.500 sub-divisions of property took place and that, in 1965, some 50% to 60% of all arable land was subject to expropriation because of the size of the estates. Nevertheless, the 1973 expropriation figures reveal that in spite of the latifundias (large-scale properties) having been expropriated almost entirely, more than two thirds of the cultivable land still was on private hands.

As far as economic boycott goes, actions were introduced like for example the extermination of reproductive live-stock. Thousands of head of livestock were sacrificed in clandestine slaughterhouses or smuggled into Argentinan areas at the southern border. The diminution of sown land and the almost zero-like private investment in agriculture was another example. The proprietors publicly justified such a measure by sustaining that the existing situation brought about by the Popular Government did not give guarantees to the private sector, so logically it was unreasonable to demand of them risky investments and intensive exploitation of their agricultural possessions. Another factor hinted at by the same group as "inconvenient" was the compulsory readjustment of salaries in the agricultural sector and the proliferation of farmers' trade unions enacting such regulations

With respect to the situation of agriculture up to September 11 and the policy that henceforward was applied they are thus defined by the Military Junta: (Augusto Pinochet: "A Year of Construction", pp. 239-256)

"One of the most serious problems the present Government had to confront, was the chaotic state of our agriculture which came to suffer heavy disorder on all levels due to a ruining policy".

"It was necessary to reestablish authority to initiate a technical campaign for the recuperation of production and productivity in the countryside by help of agricultural work".

"An extraordinary effort underlies the initiation of a real program, the putting in order and correction of abuses in the sector represented by the Agrarian Reform, a tool handled with merciless vigour in the past".

"The process of expropriation was accelerated to a maximum thus affecting the largest number of properties without taking into consideration exactly how they were exploited. It resorted to loopholes in the law and technical reports elaborated by non-professionals, all with the sole purpose of annihilating the economic, social and political power represented by the existence of a large number of land-owners".

As we have earlier made clear, the number of landed estates expropriated during the Frei and U.P. administrations does not surpass 5.000 units; besides, expropriation has only been permitted in the case of estates counting more than 80 hectares of ground irrigation land. This instrument was then taken advantage of to destroy the latifundio and its economic, political and social power as the Military Junta so fittingly drives it home.

Part of the rearrangement within the agrarian sector postulated by the Junta has been the devolution of expropriated farm estates to their former owners. Among the programs being carried out by the Corporation of Agrarian Reform, CORA, there is one called "Regularization of Illegal Expropriations":

"This program is regarded as concluded with the regularization of 2.858 properties corresponding to a regularized area of approximately 1.500.000 hectares".

We may conclude that if the application of the Law of Agrarian Reform was "pitiless" during the U.P. Government, the "unapplication" of it on behalf of the Junta would deserve the same characterization.

#### 4.2. The Social Area. The Rearrangement of Industrial Property and Other Economic Sectors.

The social area ought to embrace several economic sectors, namely the exploitation of basic riches, fundamentally those of copper, iron and saltpeter, foreign and private banks, foreign commerce, monopoly enterprises of distribution, industrial monopolies and other strategic activities like the production and distribution of electric energy; land, maritime and air transport; the production and refinement of mineral oil with its derivatives, the monopolies of construction materials, the telephone companies and, in general, all the basic activities necessary for the socio-economic development of the country.

The big capital of monopoly, national as well as foreign, was subject to a considerable shock with the U.P. nationalization program. Among the principal realizations on this sector we may mention for instance the nationalization of the copper mining, the main source of Chile's value holdings; an act intensely yearned for in the majority of the population. Popular pressure for the nationalization of the copper industry, then, increases to such an extent that not even the most conservative sectors of Congress stood a chance against its consumption.

Already in 1971, with regard to other mineral riches, the state controlled the production of saltpeter and iodine; on the energy sector it dominated about 100% of the coal and oil productions, the derived industries of the latter being included, and electricity. Practically the entire production of iron came on state hands when the Pacific Steel Company was nationalized and the minerals of the Bethlehem Chile Iron Company fell victim to a similar destiny.

By then, the manufacturing industry, some food industries, the main beverage monopoly, certain chemical and metal-mechanical industries etc. were likewise under control.

Nationalization, furthermore, came to national and foreign Private banking and other commercial, financial organisms. To succeed in this, the methods used by the state <sup>was</sup> the purchase of shares from private persons. Such a measure <sup>was</sup> considered of extreme importance for the redirection and nationalization of the credit system.

## 5.- Autonomy (Dependence)

Undoubtedly, the nationalization program corresponded to the implementation of a policy of self-determination. The existence of a situation of economic dependence had brought the country to a state of underdevelopment. On more than one occasion the relationship between riches, obtained by North-American companies from Chilean copper and the total budget of the nation had been made. With the estimated amount of profit the Chilean budget would have been financed for years.

On the other hand, in order to carry out expropriations of the copper companies, the so-called "Allende doctrine" opened up a perspective heavily marked by the idea of self-determination and social justice for many Third-World countries fighting to defend their basic resources. The doctrine stipulates that expropriation be done by paying the companies for installations, machinery etc. although discounting a certain amount for what is called "excessive rentability". In this way two criteria are established: first, that natural riches are unequivocally national patrimony; second, that companies which in virtue of their excessive rentability have already become self-compensated have no right to collect double indemnification. Calculations concerning the case of the copper companies were legally authorized by the general comptrollership of the republic and were made within the prerogatives established by the Chilean Constitution.

The result was that out of the five big mining companies subject to the procedure, three of them -Chuquibambilla, El Salvador (Anaconda Mining Company) and El Teniente (Kennecott) - got no compensation, and even remained indebted to the Chilean State: the first by 76 mill. US-dollars, the second by 1,6 mill. and the last by 310,4 millions. As to the two remaining companies, the Exotica and the Andina, the former received 10 mill. US dollars by the state in compensation, the latter 18 millions.

Although the nationalization program is of extraordinary importance, the problem of dependence cannot be resolved by the above-mentioned measures only since the mechanisms of domination practiced by the hegemonial centre are far more complex and have been changing over the last years. Enclaves of direct exploitation of foreign capital have given in to other types of bonds characteristic of the structure of imperialism. Underdeveloped economies are being retronourished by the invisible threads of financial,

technological, military, political and cultural dependence. All these manifestations of imperialism were to leave their print on Chilean economy in particular and on the country's socio-political process in general, for the years to come.

The international division of labour condemns underdeveloped economies to maintain a course of "development" conditioned by their hegemonic centres. This is why, for instance, the entire great nationalized mining industry earlier depended on material supplies and machinery from North America; provisions of materials for the mining industry had to an even larger extent to be delivered by branch companies of the consortiums which later declared frontal war on the state of Chile. To maintain supplies, then, one is forced to make necessary purchases in European markets (also in subsidiary ones) with delays of up to even more than a year. Virtual adventures had to be done to get hold of what production demands, while simultaneously one was counting on cooperation with third parts like for example Argentine enterprises. It<sup>was</sup> not only nationalized companies that suffered the problem of supply of material; rather, during the period it turn<sup>ed</sup> into a generalized process affecting the whole national industry.

The evil called "financial aid" was another mechanism of penetration practiced by imperialism. It was nothing but the placing of capital in underdeveloped countries, a far safer procedure than direct investments since there was no danger of expropriation. Such capital financed good, profitable transactions that open up perspectives of establishing industries, which again would consume technology and materials, supplies and machinery produced by the centre hegemony. Many a time these industries were to acquire the shape of subsidiaries of multinationals thus sealing the destiny of industrialization by joining it to the destiny of the imperial industrial network.

On the other hand, loans of the non-direct investment type would be able to finance purchases realized by the Third World of food-products, oil and other basic material. Such a mechanism was a very open one manifesting itself without any "decorousness" through the main agencies of financial aid like the AID, BID and others. It was even given the official name of "tied loans".

The external debt with which the Popular Government took over the country reached 4.000 million US dollars. The debt spiral had increased considerably over the last years of Christian Democratic administration.

The nationalization policy of the Popular Government to give new treatment to foreign capital motivated a negative answer on behalf of the financial organisms controlled by the U.S.; consequently there is a notable diminution of credit and loans granted Chile. On top of this comes the discontinuation of credits from the international private banking organization. Thus Chile, early among the major receivers of North-American "help" experienced, a brusque descent in the scale of preferences. Figures on official bilateral aid from the U.S. Official Development Aid Organization (ODA), indicate that in 1970 Chile received 39 million dollars, and for this very reason receives only 7 million in 1971. Also in 1970, there were 41 million dollars in development loans and 8,2 millions in 1971

The data above correspond to the U.S. official aid, but in order to see the general situation we shall compare the data regarding the official bilateral aid with those regarding multilateral institutions (USA and Europe) with the exception of the Socialist countries.

TABLE 5

	1969 - 1971	1970 - 1972
Bilateral	47,9	35,1
Multilateral	33,5	6,1
Total	81,4	41,4

source: Statistical Year Book U.N. 1972, 1973

The economic blockade against the Government was at the same time, accompanied by "generous contributions" from the U.S to the Chilean Armed Forces. The "military aid" granted Chile by the U.S. between 1950 and 1970 is larger than any other loan granted the remaining Latin-American countries, with the sole exception of Brazil (175,8 mill. US dollars). The figure equals 10% of the national defence budget for the same period. A similar aid level is maintained during the three years of U.P. Government, an unmistakable indication that if there ever existed

a prominent force element in the solving of contradictions in Chile, it must be the political and economic forces of imperialism.

Among other things, the military aid included projects of instruction, sale of material and the like. Over the last twenty years more than 4000 Chilean officers are supposed to have received their training in the U.S. and in North American schools in the Canal Zone of Panama. Technical advice is a permanent element as are also journeys of exchange of military missions. The efficiency of the training was to be seen on September 11, 1973

The Ambassador of the military junta in Washington, Air Force General Walter Heitmann, sums up present-day relations between both governments in the following manner:

"Relations between Chile and the U.S. are going through an 'excellent' period. North American authorities have with deeds expressed their decision to help Chile despite parliamentary limitations existing in the Northern country as to such policy. There is an astonishing interest in private circles to invest in Chile".  
(El Mercurio international ed. 32-29, Dec. 1974).

Actually, an affirmation of this sort cannot cause surprise since the economic policy of the Junta has given abundant examples of favors granted the international big capital. With the total dissolution of the so-called Social Area confiscated or regularized foreign enterprises were returned to their former owners; those bought by the State were set up for sale, likewise others that have always been state-property.

In January 1975 the Minister of Finance declared that "the CORFO has already turned back 220 companies confiscated or controlled by Marxism of which 26 are being restored while 56 firms or packages of shares are for sale. The destiny of 59 is being renegotiated, 18 do not have their feature defined, 20 will be kept up by the CORFO with transitory of definite participation of the State". (El Mercurio international edition 20-26 Jan. 1975)

With respect to the financial area, in December 1974 the property system of the banks took effect laying down norms for the undoing of their state nationalization. Official declarations simultaneously maintain<sup>ed</sup> that "the way is being prepared for the entrance of foreign banks, all in accordance with the dispositions prescribed by the 'Statute of Foreign Investment' ".

The dictation of above mentioned law on behalf of the Junta raised an extremely intensive polemic in Latin American countries belonging to the Andean Pact to the extent that it violated requirements laid down by the Agreement of Cartagena; the latter establishes certain restrictions on foreign capital as a minimum protection for own national interests. The requirements approved by the Junta produced opposition from all signatory countries of the Andean Pact; consequently the statute in question had to be modified under the threat of the pact breaking up.

In spite of the incidence, the Junta has continued its policy of attracting the competition of international capitalism. As tokens of "good-will" it has granted the Anaconda Company a compensation of millions. "On July 23rd, 1974, the Government promulgated a decree by virtue of which the North American firm Anaconda Company will be paid 59.349.000 dollars for the 49% of shares that it held in the minerals of Chuquicamata and El Salvador and which were nationalized in 1971. At the same time a treaty was signed for an amount of 194.059.086 dollars payable over a period of ten years. The agreement was due to the saldo resulting from the shares bought by the State under the regime of "Chileanization" " (El Mercurio, internat. ed. 22-28 July 1974).

Similar treaties are negotiated with the Kennecot and ITT companies of which the latter, in December 1975, obtained a no less millionlike indemnification. The Chilean press commented that the ITT-agreement was characterized by its business agent as "Christmas present to the Chilean people".

However strange it may sound that compensation to the big, powerful ITT company was presented as a gift, its explanation lies in the fact that the ITT will reinvest part of this amount in Chile. Thus, an enterprise is expropriated but is immediately permitted to reestablish itself in the country, this time in the form of "Centre of Technological Research. The International Telegraph and Telephone is given 95.000.000 dollars out of which 25 millions will be invested in the above mentioned centre.

Apart from all these small indications of confidence, efforts are being made to motivate investors in international circles with the "advantages of our natural riches". Already in October 1974 the Secretary of the Committee of Foreign Investments declares



to El Mercurio that 17 international companies were interested in making investments in Copper Mining. With respect to this we would like to mention that<sup>in</sup> the north of the country there are now newly announced deposits of the precious copper metal, deposits that are estimated to be larger and in better conditions than the once nationalized ones.

Together with the "advantages", given to foreign investment, the economic reorganization prompted by the Junta included some measures of economic "rationalization" in the industrial area, steps that did not take long in stirring up a certain moderate resistance on part of the industrial sector, not excluding the small- and medium scale commerce and even the big national industry. As indications of the reaction there are statements made by some agents representing the country's economic life; men who play an important role in directing the so-called "frontal attack on Marxism". A prominent industrial representative who had been president of the SOFOFA under Allende and who had also been one of the main instigators of the coup d'etat, declared in 1975 that "the adaptation of a scheme that encourages economic concentration and financial speculation at the expense of productive investment has been the main cause of the dead-point of growth that we are approaching". (Ercilla No. 2058). It is rather suggestive that the National Institute of Statistics (an official organism) points to a 1974 diminution to + 1,9% in industrial growth. The same representative maintains that "at present the majority of manufacturers are bogged down by economic and financial problems while money, on the other hand, is obtained at an interest superior to 15% monthly (Ercilla No. 2058). (17)

Personally we find that the explanation of the crisis on the industrial sector rests on the policy of economic adjustment to an imposed model, a model in which one is trying to practice the international division of labour, the cornerstone of development, given the system's "comparative advantages"

A disciple of Professor Haberger, instructor of the economic model, has pointed out that Chile ought to dedicate itself to the growing of melons for which the country has natural aptitude. He further says that if this had been done instead of making investments in for example the car industry, we would today have been able to buy better imported cars than those produced in the country, and more. Rather than an anecdotic remark, this is the reflection

of a policy applied without any restrictions at all. Among the measures to realize it we have the following.

Firstly, the exchange-policy with its permanent devaluation of the escudo and unification of exchange-rates. Previously the U.P. Government had established a policy of diversity of exchange-rates thereby producing up to nine different types. Products of **basic importance** like foodstuff and **material** for the production were rated artificially low, while the dollar of importation for luxury articles, tourism etc. was higher. There was no freedom of importation, though, this being one of the fundamental measures of protection on behalf of the national industry and which, by the way, was not created by the U.P. but dates back to earlier periods.

Today, the dollar of importation is levelled while restrictions on importation **for a list of products** , have been abolished.

Measures of a similar kind, then, liquidate small-and medium-scale industries which lack the economic capacity to absorb expenses of production. In short, they **eliminate** all those unable to compete with imported goods. They strengthen both national and foreign monopolies. Natural riches are exploited by multinational companies while the national economy is concentrated on activities for which it is suitable like, for instance, the "growing of melons". The arrangement, no doubt, is convenient for elites **connected** with the moving centres of the model.

Totally, however, financial aid given to the Junta has been generous. In August 1974 the following piece of information makes its appearance in El Mercurio:

"In Washington one is let to know that Chile and Brazil will be the most favoured hemispherical nations with the US. programs of military sales and economic assistance. Our country will receive 84.976.000 dollars; of these 63 millions represent economic support, while 21 millions make up direct military aid and military sales on credit".

Also credits and loans from private banks and international agencies have been reactivated. According to sources of the Resistance Movement abroad, since the day of the coup the Junta has probably received more than a thousand million dollars in financial aid. In this paper we shall present a compilation, done by us, from the newspaper El Mercurio, (international ed.) which covers the period from October 1974 to March 1975.

TABLE 6  
FINANCIAL SUPPORT GIVEN TO THE JUNTA FROM OCT.74 to March 75

INSTITUTION:	(mill. of US-\$):	Date of the <u>Mercurios</u> :
EXIMBANK	42.00	Oct.28, Nov.3 - 74
Marubeni Co.(Japan)	22.00	" " "
AID	9,11	Nov. 4-10, "
U.S. Government	17,10	Nov. 18-24 "
FAG. I.B.	60,00	" " " "
Rep. Bank of Argentina	20,00	Nov.25, Dec. 1 "
CAF	2,00	Dec.23-29 "
US private banks	255,00	" " "
West-German Government	8,40	Jan.13-19 75
AID	15,00	" " "
Bank of Brazil	2,40	Feb.17-23 "
US Government	2,17	" " "
FMI	77,00	Feb.24, March 2 "
BID	100,00	" " "
FMI	100,00	" " "
BM	80,00	" " "
Chase Manhat.Bank } First Nl.City Bank }	50,00	Jan.27, Feb.2 "
Ide Bank of Supply & Reconstruction	20,00	" " "
Bank of Nova Scotia & Toronto	2,00	" " "
Japan Enterprise	14,00	Feb.24, March 2 "
US banks	1,20	" " "
Grace USA	8,00	" " "
TOTAL, in six months	898,38	

NOTE: In this compilation we have counted credits, loans and guarantees as financial support. We think that these figures clearly indicate that the economic problem present in today's Chile is not due to lack of financial help which, actually, has been more abundant than ever in the history of the country. Indeed, the signs of "goodwill" towards foreign companies, international organisms and related governments have been overcompensated. The road leading to denationalization of the economy is open with recovered natural resources again at the disposal of the powerful imperialism that one once tried to challenge.

## 6.- Solidarity and Participation (marginalization)

In our opinion, the viability of one socio-political project or another does not lie in its internal coherence, neither in the "charm" of its formulation, rather, projects are conditioned by a simple question, namely the exercise of power.

This historical truth was foreseen even in the formulation of the U.P. program in which it was stated that "the revolutionary changes that the country needs can only come true if the people takes power in its own hands and exercises it in a true, creative way". (U.P. program).

Undoubtedly, three years of U.P. rule stimulated popular progress to an extraordinary degree. Innumerable channels of participation were created, the urban and rural masses had as they never did before the possibility of expressing themselves while, simultaneously, elevating their level of consciousness. Nevertheless, this would only be a half truth if we did not add that the process was partly influenced by illusions of the so-called "chilean road to socialism".

According to this idea, the idiosyncrasies of the chilean people, its civic maturity, the special characteristics of the chilean Armed Forces, its constitutional tradition would be a sufficient guarantee for the Popular Government, constitutionally and democratically elected by popular consent as it was, to carry out its program of changes and to start on the road towards socialist construction.

The partial success of application of the U.P program in its fundamental aspects, the blows dealt national capital of monopoly and foreign companies, the creation of a social area in economy, the acceleration of the agrarian reform, the redistribution of income and social justice which many measures brought in their wake, all this seemed to prove, in practice the above mentioned chilean way: that bourgeois democracy and its institutions were susceptible to change within the system. What the tragic chilean experience did not prove, though, was that such a reality also could be accepted by the dominant classes and imperialism.

The chilean way held an element of enormous attraction, namely the one called "minimum social cost". It was asserted that the

chilean revolution was been carried ahead without loss of lives, imprisonments or suppression of human rights. What turned out to be true, though, was that this social cost was not paid by the dominant classes, and that today it is certainly being paid by the chilean people, with interest, beginning with president Allende himself who died heroically in 'La Moneda' on September 11, 1973.

The most important aspect of the "1000 days of the Unidad Popular" was the mobilization around the political project that opened the real chance to transform oneself from a object to a subject.

More than a slogan this was the everyday life to almost any chilean belonging to the oppressed class.

At the end of 1972, a "popular power" began to emerge, autonomous of the government.

The reactionary offensive showed that the real power of bourgeoisie was untouched and the forces behind the dominant class were prepared to defend their privileges in spite of the existence of the popular government. They were prepared to destroy the constitution, all the democratic mechanisms created by themselves, included a legal and democratic government, like Allende's one was.

In that situation to create popular power was needed to defend all the radical changes undergone by the chilean society.

In this task the working class gave several proves of creativity: hundred of committees at local level were created. Committees to defend the expropriated factories, the nationalized mining, the expropriated land-properties and so on.

The popular mobilization was not only a response to critical situations but a continuous and rich process to overcome all the difficulties derivated from the process of change we have described in this paper.

On the other hand in the "peaceful time" if we can call it so it was a real cultural flowering of the working masses, the theatre, the music, the poetry was not only for the élites but also for others.

The voice of the forgotten the poor of the cities and the poor of the countryside, could be heard for the first time after years of exploitation. A feeling of human dignity and self respect was the result of this cultural and political mobilization.

## 7.- Ecological balance

The way we have defined this dimension of value it makes reference to the use or abuse of the surrounding(s) measured by the degree of exhaustion of natural resources or the destruction of the surroundings by pollution and poisoning. In Chile, a policy answering such an imperious need to protect the habitat has never been implemented. The voracity with which foreign interests have exploited our natural resources has prevented the country even from being conscious about the need. The socio-political project of the U.P. considered as one of its most important goals the recuperation of the country's natural wealth. In the case of copper, a pityless and irrational exploitation practiced by foreign companies brought about exhaustion of deposits, physical deterioration of mines and ideological deformation of ample sectors of the society. The so-called "floreo" of the mines means that faced with the danger of expropriation during its last months the North American Administration felt obliged to exploit the sectors of the deposits where the best quality copper was found; an activity realized without respecting any rational plan of extraction. On the mine of El Salvador such a procedure rendered useless several sectors of the deposit, which again makes future exploitation impossible. The "plundering" of the mines was undertaken in the period of "Chileanization", with accomplices like administrators provided employment by the Frei Government in collaboration with the North American Administration.

It would be a tedious task to enumerate cases of exhaustion of natural resources of which there is finally nothing left for the country and its future generations: indiscriminate cutting down of forest resources, exhaustion of whales in the Antarctic Sea, overpopulation of cities, anarchic concentration of industries etc.etc.

Apart from isolated efforts as, for instance, the replantation of 100.000 hectares of forest in 1971 and projects to maintain a similar plan, we may say that the principal endeavour during the U.P. period was focussed on the recuperation of basic resources.

This, of course, ~~was~~ the first and fundamental step, the one that rendered possible a policy of conservation and nationalization that, inspired by a truly social motivation, would permit the protection of the national **heritage** for present and future generations.

Today, this responsibility for present and future **has become** the victim of unrestricted competition, of profit and of the survival of the Capitalist system.

## 8.- Final Remmarks

In our opinion, this summarized view of the chilean process under the Unidad Popular and now under junta rule shows that WIP concept of development and the value dimensions behind it is a very "sensible tool" to analyze and understand the complex interrelation between the "ideal society" people seeks and the necessary and sufficient conditions to reach it.

As we saw, the Unidad Popular project and the rich process of change that was open in the years 1970-1973 were more or less formulated in the same way as WIP ideal society. Satisfaction of human needs and personal growing were the goals leading millions of persons. The failures, the problems created, the difficulties, and at the end the frustration of the experience, only shows that some of the necessary conditions we have mentioned were not present: the main of these "peoples control of power" to realize and defend its own project.

On the other hand, the junta seems to have "control of power". Nevertheless, it has been able to force only partially its own society model, and without doubt it will be only temporarily. They lack other necessary conditions to impose it. The main of these: to overwin the peoples resistance against the dictatorship.

With regard to the junta's model of society, we can only say that it contradicts each of the WIP value dimensions: no personal growing, no justice, no pluralism, no participation etc are going on.

To apply this concept in the analysis of junta period could be taken as an irony, but the real suffering of the chilean ~~men~~, ~~women~~ and children makes this irony even more tragic.

If one conscribe that the science is part of the efforts the mankind does reaching a better society, so one has to agree that WIP concepts are useful, even though they could only be used to compare the bad society many live in ~~with~~ the beautiful one we could have if...



## APPENDIX

### The coup and its aftermath.-

In order to complete the picture of the Chilean society done in this paper we shall refer to some of the political implications of the different strategies inside the left forces.

At the same time, we can not forget that the present situation in the country is a direct result of many failures and weakness in the leadership,

The price paid is so high that nobody who has been involved can avoid to recognize his responsibility.

We think that the Chilean people and the U.P administration gave abundant proof of 'historical originality', what the dominant classes did not. They answered such an original effort in the same way, with the same methods, and with the same brutality that has been repeated all through history each time the dominant system found itself threatened.

The coup was, throughout the three years, like a background curtain for the process. It was hanging over the heads of the Government and the people like a sinister guillotine.

Imperialism and the reaction gave the orders, the armed forces carried them out with the precision and effectiveness that can be seen today. Even at the time when danger of the coup was perfectly present in the majority of the population and its political directors, strategy of confrontation was an altogether different matter. There crystallized two tendencies within the U.P., within the Government and then within other sectors outside the U.P., the MIR-party. This difference of evaluation had its roots in the very idea of the problem of fight for power and, logically, the necessary strategy to oppose the reaction.

The dominant tendency within the U.P. sustained by President Allende, the Communist Party, the MAPUOC, the Radical Party, sectors of the Socialist Party and others were at that time in the process of affirming itself in the constitutionality of the Government. It was invoking the constitutional tradition of the armed forces explicitly in order to avoid giving any kind of 'motives' that might

precipitate the coup. Such a policy integrated people in uniform into the Cabinet; it included the devolution of firms 'seized' by workers in the October lockout which were not on the official list of expropriations; there were the attempt to strike up a dialogue with the Christian Democrats and the dispute with the popular mobilization from either the government or the party directors in favour of the strategy. With all the complications characteristic of the above mentioned strategy, the initiative was left in the hands of the reaction. There was a fundamental reason for it happening, namely that the only guarantee required by the opposition was the overthrowing of the popular government, a question that naturally could not be agreed to voluntarily.

The other tendency present in many parties of the U.P., especially within the Socialist, Left-Christian party, and in MIR, postulated that the only way of securing the duration of the popular government was to strengthen popular power; i.e. win power-positions through all possible means at hand and basically prepare the organization of the working class and the people in general, in case of an armed confrontation. As far as the armed forces were concerned, according to such a tendency the strategy ought to have been to sharpen the contradictions in their very bosom, producing dismissal of officers, especially of the High Command marked by couplike tendencies, thereby causing a fission within the very core of that institution. As a point of information, let us mention that it lay within the constitutional authority of the President of the Republic to control the movements of the High Command, an authority President Allende utilized to a very restricted degree.

The hypothesis would be that if it were handled the way indicated, the reaction would find its initiative curtailed because of an already existing counter-power. The decision to stage or not stage a coup under such circumstances would necessarily have to take into consideration the possibility of starting a civil war.

Without the intention of analyzing either strategy in great detail, we find it indispensable to say that the coup of September 11 was realized over the heads of an unarmed people. Not even the U.P. parties were any more prepared than the masses for an armed confrontation. In some industries 'home-made arms' were improvised, above all during the last month after the unsuccessful

coup-attempt on June 29th, 1973. However, the masses had no other means of defending themselves than an enormous spirit of sacrifice

On the 11th thousands of workers all over the country gathered in their work-centres while thousands of students assembled in their centres of study. The weapons at people's disposal were old hunting rifles, personal defense pistols like the ones used by individuals in their homes to ward off burglars, arms that logically could not stand up against neither air bombardments, tanks, nor more modern automatic rifles which the Chilean armed forces rely on. It was likewise impossible to attempt a confrontation with the professional troops especially trained in war operations. In the working centres, therefore, resistance took place fundamentally through ideological arms that unfortunately turned out insufficient and scarcely effective faced with the power of fire from the regular troops. Until the last minute, thousands of workers were only waiting for arms supposed to be supplied from loyal troops at the command of loyal officers. These arms never came.

President Allende decided to put up resistance until death, thus defending the presidential mandate given to him by the people. At three o'clock in the afternoon La Moneda was on fire, it had been bombarded by the 'hawker hunters' operated by pilots from the Chilean air forces trained in the US. Before he died, President Allende sent his last message to the people of Chile - - - -

"other men will overcome this grey and bitter moment, but you shall know that rather sooner than later the wide public walks will once again be opened up to the free human being of the New Society".

The Chilean Way to Socialism was closed; the original experience which Chile wanted to show the world had come to an end.

The dominant -class and its armed hands, represented by the armed forces, played their historical role, but the task of the fight for power is still in force in present day Chile in the people and its organizations so heavily pounded down.

From the understanding of this situation arises the policy of the Junta to maintain itself in power. The military success on the 11th of September was an easy one, and obvious, besides, given the inequality of existing conditions of confrontation. What has not been easy for the Junta and the interest groups it represents, however, is the total subjugation of a people that is already ideologically equipped. The first repressive measures to maintain

control are today found institutionalized making the 'state of internal war', of siege etc. normal aspects of everyday life in Chile.

From the comprehension of the fact that bourgeois democracy is susceptible to self-transformation and to the vulnerability of institutions and state of affairs traditionally considered immovable, there arises today a policy of 'remodelling democracy'; democracy being - according to supporters of the new regime - something entirely crushed to pieces not only in Chile, but in the entire world.

As a result, all channels of participation created by the bourgeois democratic system are closed, channels regarded as extremely 'dangerous' by the new authorities.

- Decree No.27, September 24th, 1973:

The National Congress is brought to a close.

- Decree No.119, November 1973:

The Constitutional Court of Justice is suppressed.

- Decree No.24, September 22, 1973:

The Municipalities are eliminated.

- Decree No.77, No.78, No.145:

Leftist political parties are declared illegal.  
Right wing parties are suspended.

- Decree No.130:

All elections are suspended while the electoral registers are burnt.

- Decree No.133, No.198, No.32:

The National Labour Union is destroyed, syndical activities are prohibited, the Statute Law of syndical directors is eliminated, petitions are prohibited, syndical elections are replaced by nominations realized by the military authority. The mandate of the Union organizations already in force on Sept. 11, is extended for another year (decree No.349)

The present constitution of the State is not known. In its analytical part, decree No.788 declares that all decrees issued by the Military Junta, whether on any point they be contrary or opposed to or different from the political constitution of the State, have had and still have the quality of norms modifying the corresponding precepts of the constitution, whether of explicit or

implicit, partial or total character.

- Decree No.527:

It includes the Juridical Statute promulgated by the Junta in order to establish rules for the exercise of constituent, legislative and executive powers; the latter, in fact, were assumed by the Militaries already on September 11th. All powerd are concentrated in the hands of the Junta Government.

In August 1974, Augusto Pinochet has himself made a banner of the Head of State with the badge of the Executive Power (the shield and flower of O'Higgins). He publicly declares that the "judicial validity of this designation is rooted in the historical legitimacy of September 11".

Since September 11 (almost three years), curfew is ruling all night throughout the national territory.

To maintain such a state of affairs, the use of repression has been institutionalized.

- Decree No.521, June 1974:

The Agency of National Intelligence is created. "This organism was given life in consideration of the need for the Supreme Government to have immediate and permanent collaboration of a body able to proportion, in a systematic and duly processed way, required information for resolutions in the field of national security and development" (El Mercurio, 17-23 of June 1974).

The DINA, an organism of coordination belonging to the Intelligence Service of the Army and civil police branches, was quick to demonstrate its efficiency; the introduction of computer systems and modern electronic brains was made sufficiently public by the regime.

A list can be established of DINA operations on a large scale in the months of July, August and September, all published in the international ed. of El Mercurio, where the repressive operations are being detailed with great care. The information obtained from El Mercurio was highly contrary to the official versions about numbers of people under arrest and about the "respect for human rights".

- July 22nd to 28th, 1974: "Thousands of persons were arrested in massive round-ups conducted by Carabineers and the Civil Police in cooperation with the Army. A Carabineros statement reports that

the result of last week-end's operation was the detention of 10.828 persons because of different crimes. Days later there was a round-up in the capital with 522 arrest orders. In Temuco, in the course of a two days' police operation 215 persons were seized. On July 21 the carabineros had to intervene to calm down a riot produced in a "beat-festival". A lot of participants were under the influence of narcotics; 219 persons were put under arrest".

- August 5th to 11th: "Yesterday a general preventive operation against delinquency was realized by the Civil Police from 2 p.m. until far passed midnight. Dozens of representatives from the police vehicle squad had several suburbs inspected, for instance 'La Hermita', 'La Legua', 'José Maria Caro' and others, all supposed to give cover to some dangerous vagabond elements. At the end of the operation more than a hundred persons had been arrested on account of police antecedents".
  
- August 12th to 18th: "In Concepcion in the suburb of 'Agüita Fresca', contiguous with the University Town, a wholesale operation was undertaken. Conducted by military staff represented by the Carabineros under the command of Colonel Charles Hansel Krause it concluded in the early morning hours of the 15th. Result: The detention of many persons dedicated to clandestine activities".
  
- August 26th, September 1: "Yesterday in a massive round-up effected by the air force, Carabineros and staff from the Investigations 300 delinquents were arrested. In the gigantic operation there participated some 800 uniformed people apart from the Civil Police. The populations of interest were 'Pablo de Rokha', 'Seis de Mayo' and 'Raul del Canto'. The mass-arrest included the destroying of houses and the detention of males over 15 years of age; all without coming to any kind of incidents. The operation lasted about six hours. Officially it was affirmed that Marxist literature, arms and explosives were confiscated".
  
- September 2 to 8: "Yesterday morning between five and nine, detectives from the Investigations aided by Air Force and the Buin Regiment personnel, effected a 'raking operation' in the population of 'Martin Luther King'. The new electronic systems for the control of special information were made use of. In a record time the detectives investigated more than 600 persons (6 because of Marxist propaganda, 7 because of their defaulter sheet, 4 because of their control cards etc."

"On the other hand, the police informed that on May 21st, 62 persons were seized in commercial establishments on Manjitas street and Sta. Domingo, in an open operation carried out on Tuesday".

In December 1974, colonel Jorge Espinoza Ulloa, head of the National Executive Secretariat of Detained Persons, makes a public declaration "with the purpose of impairing affirmations from abroad about people under arrest". He points out that "2.900 individuals are still held back in different places around the country, people that are either fulfilling their sentence or have been prosecuted. The SENDET, furthermore, has under its protection 760 persons arrested in connection with the stage of siege. The number includes all those resorting to the program of exit from the country". (El Mercurio, Dec.30 - Jan.5, 1975)

What, then, was to happen to the people reported by El Mercurio to have been arrested those months? It is important to add that the type of operations described by the newspaper has continued afterwards, but not so its publication.

In its official publication called 'A Year of Construction', a report that replaces the traditional announcement rendered by the President to Congress, the Junta expressed that "In the Budget Law of the present year there have been created 1.162 new positions to be filled by guards, experts and instructors. Thanks to such a measure the Service has managed to improve its equipment compared to what they had in 1972 and the first part of 1973. This is so although the office is still suffering from staff shortage due to a brusque increase of penal population, a phenomenon explained by an elevated entrance of criminals, which in its turn is a result of infringements on the Military Code".

We dare say that the mentioned public service is the only one which has increased its number of staff; let us not forget the reductions in services like Health, Education and others. Thus, on the internal level the Junta has its only base of support in intensive and systematic use of repression. Externally it receives financial and 'technical' aid from the hegemonic centre to have the above mentioned repressive apparatus strengthened, a strategy that also **reinforces** conditions favourable to imperialistic penetration.

At the same time, however, such a domination of the situation and the momentary stability of the regime is being permanently exposed to danger.

Internationally, from the very day of the 11th of September 1973, the most radicalized sectors of society started to organize a Movement of Resistance to the military regime. Thanks to a general dissatisfaction in wide social layers where people have suffered from the effects of the economic and repressive policies, the movement has been strengthened.

At present underground newspapers are circulating; there are so-called 'Committees of Resistance' existing all over the country, and there are actions of minor sabotage; some strikes have been organized; from time to time there are successful cases of pamphlet-distribution and mural writing; there is direct communication with the external world that provides information about prisoners, concentration camps and violation of human rights; there is postage entering and leaving the territory; there are prudent mass-demonstrations: Some days after the coup, for instance, when the poet Pablo Neruda was buried, there were thousands of participants in the funeral procession, people who walked the entire route singing the International and shouting political slogans like 'Comrade Salvador Allende', 'presente'

Such an act of unusual courage given existing circumstances, represents an unquestionable advance showing that the people will not let themselves be subjugated. On this particular occasion, those who joined the march were mainly militants from the Communist Party and "on the whole" ordinary people. Throughout the whole procession there were armed pickets patrolling the streets.

Other occasions have later on been taken advantage of to stage mass-demonstrations; such as the special case of a religious act organized by the Catholic Church to inaugurate a God's House. Approximately one million people attended the act in which also slogans of the resistance movement were heard. The Junta, already knowing from previous experience what kind of character the meeting would take, avoided to turn up.

During the last 18 months there have come to certain armed confrontations in the towns as well as in the country-side, incidents about which the official press has only given partial information.

The reorganization of leftist parties has been slow although,



quite undoubtedly, today's political picture is qualitatively different. The tough conditions under which they are being reborn have made it unavoidable to renew methods and modify failing strategies. Apart from the Leftist parties, dissatisfied voices from sectors associated with the Christian Democrats are also emerging, the same voices that previously were in favour of a 'dialogue' with the Allende Government; and finally, other repentant democrats who are likewise suffering from the want of democratic practices which they themselves very efficiently helped to bury.

This profound discontent represents a 'behaviour' of opposition to the dictatorship, but not a road leading to its overthrow. Such a reality is the reason why, on the left wing as well as outside it, there are once again differences of estimation.

We do think, however, that differences of this kind will be overcome, this because the experience newly lived through in Chile, the sacrifice of thousands of lives beginning with President Allende himself, the thousands of imprisoned and tortured comrades and the implacable policy implemented by the Junta in order to maintain its power-position are facts that have already predestined the only possible way. In other words, facing positions of force one can only oppose that force, an opposition that ought to be conscious and organized. At present this is what the Chilean people is building up, day by day, in its resistance movement.

The righteousness of the Chilean liberation fight has awakened an enormous movement of solidarity in the world; from the humanitarian actions of foreign embassies to help exiled persons, to the world's condemnation of the Chilean Military Junta made in the United Nations. The Movement of solidarity includes the most varied sectors around the world, all from those who show militant solidarity to those who are horrified by the methods and brutality practiced by the Junta.

The successful results of such activity are already visible. Many lives have been saved, prisoners have been set free while conditions reigning in the concentration camps have partly been improved. But however important, this activity is not sufficient. As an entity of help to the Chilean people, the solidary movement ought simultaneously to present consciousness in face of the danger

which the existence of an imperialistic structure actually means to all nations of the world.

All help given the Chilean Junta, the activities of the multinational corporations and the CIA, the military support in form of arms and training and, above all, the ideological penetration of imperialism contribute to another elite among the hundreds of elites participating in the world capitalist system. This is the main lesson that the peoples of the world can learn from the tragic Chilean experience.

## FOOTNOTES

- (1) See Johan Galtung, et al. Measuring World Development Papers No 11, Chair in Conflict and Peace Research, University of Oslo.
- (2) Taken from Sergio Ramos, Chile: Una Economía de transición ? Habana, Premio Casa de las Américas, 1972.
- (3) Consumption estimated in kilos per person published in Chile by Mensaje (june 1975) and which unfortunately only go until 1974 can be summarized in the following figures  
Annual average consumption, kilogram/person 1974/71-73  
Rice -50, beans -28, sugar -20, milk (liters)-23  
The estimate decline in average calorie consumption to the end of 1974 was 15%. Data taken from Andre Gunder Frank, Economic Genocide in Chile, April 1976
- (4) See Michel Chossudovsky, Hacia el nuevo modelo económico chileno. Inflación y redistribución del ingreso, Lima Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Depto. de Economía, 1974
- (5) Taken from Andre Gunder Frank, Economic Genocide in Chile
- (6) SOFOFA, Sociedad de Fomento Fabril, is an association of industrial owners. It has a conservative orientation.
- (7) Taken from Stefan de Vylder, Chile 1970-1973. The political economy of the rise and fall of the Unidad Popular. Stocholm, Unga filosofers förlag, 1974.
- (8) See Un año de Construcción. El Jefe de la Nación, general de Ejército Augusto Pinochet Ugarte informa al país, Santiago, 1974.

- (9) Data from 1969, taken from Chile an andean country of the South Pacific pg 149.  
Data from 1973, taken from Ercilla No 2030  
Data from 1974, taken from El Mercurio International edition 24/2 to 2/3 1975.
- (10) Taken from Ercilla No 2029
- (11) Basic, secondary, professional and technical education data taken from El pueblo debe organizarse y actuar, Consejería de Difusion de la Presidencia de la Republica, Santiago 1972  
Data for Universities taken from Un año de Construcción (junta's rapport)
- (12) For more details about formal/non formal education concept, see Johan Galtung and Veslemøy Wiese, Measuring non-formal education, papers No 14, Chair in Conflict and Peace Research, University of Oslo.
- (13) For more details about the non-formal education experience in Chile 1970-1973 see Malva Espinosa, Acerca de educación formal/informal. Una experiencia en Chile 1970-1973, papers No 15, Chair in Conflict and Peace Research, University of Oslo.
- (14) Enrique Kirberg is free now, after more than two years in prison.
- (15) See Un año de Construcción, Augusto Pinochet
- (16) Jacques Chonchol, La reforme Agraire taken from a french periodical Problemes politiques et sociaux Paris, 1974
- (17) The economical crisis has been sharpened after the "shock treatment" imposed by the junta.  
SOFOFA (industrial owners association) estimated industrial production in August 1975 at 72% of the pre-Allende year 1969. Installed capacity utilization rates are reported of 45% for the textil industry, 44% for the shoe industry, 52% for the furniture industry, 13% for the glass industry and 80 % for the food-processing industry